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Abstract - The increasing number of cyberattacks that occur today indicates that Indonesia is an easy 
target for crime actors in the cyber world. Cyberattacks are selected because they are far more 
effective than conventional attacks - the military, and the actors are also invisible. Not to mention, the 
capacity of cyber handling, both infrastructure, funds, and human resources in Indonesia is inversely 
proportional compared to the number of cyberattacks in the last decade. Intelligence strategies, 
primarily counter-intelligence, is the answer to deter and detect the attacks, while the government 
fixing the regulations and policies of national cyber threats. 
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Preface 
he increasingly complex presence 
of threats in Indonesia 
demonstrates that the dynamics of 
non-military threats continue to evolve with 
the development of time and technology. 
Cyber threat is one form of non-military 
threat whose growth rate has increased 
very rapidly in the last decade. It is 
undeniable that the advancement of cyber 
technology with its innovation of 
infrastructure further eliminates the 
boundaries between countries. The world 
seems to be more narrow and even 
                                                          
1  The author is an alumnus of Defense Studies Department of Defense Management Cohort 4 and currently 
works as a Secretariat Staff of Strategic Analysis Council since 2015 until now. 
2  “47 percent of the world’s population now use the Internet, study says” http://www.washingtonpost.com, 
22 November 2016, accessed on 5 June 2017. 
convenience and ease into two keywords in 
a job both in government and private 
organizations. Analysis and 
computerization of data in the government 
sector, financial transactions in the banking 
sector, the benefits of military technology 
on defense equipment, and various jobs 
commonly done by the public as cannot be 
separated from the existence of cyberspace 
media, including the internet. By 2016, 
approximately 47 percent of the world's 
population is already using internet 
facilities, which is up from 43 percent earlier 
in 2015.2 This figure is clearly predicted to 
T 
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continue to increase as the relationship 
between technology and time is linear. 
It is commonplace for the current 
Indonesian government to pay very high 
attention to cyber threats in recent times. In 
2016, Indonesia recorded about 1.2 million 
more cyber threats, and Indonesia it is 
expected to be in the 26th position globally 
most vulnerable to cyberattacks.3 The 
attacks are generally in the form of 
increasingly growing malware, the mode of 
data theft of bank accounts, savings 
accounts demand, credit cards, 
ransomware, and important data from 
every agency/government agencies and 
private. This means that all sectors are 
vulnerable to cyber threats at the moment. 
Some of these facts also show that 
Indonesia is an easy target for cyber-
criminal world. The intelligence approach 
seems to be the primary choice in warding 
off cyberattacks that have progressed 
phenomenally over the past decade. The 
use of counter-intelligence strategy is one 
of the necessary efforts to prevent and 
detect early on any potential cyber threats. 
                                                          
3  “Ancaman siber di Indonesia Kian 
Mengkhawatirkan”, 
http://www.cnnindonesia.com, 8 September 
2016, accessed on 5 June 2017. 
Therefore, in this paper, we will discuss 
three issues related to governance of cyber 
threats, namely, first, the increasing trend 
of cyber threats in recent times; Second, the 
type of cyberthreat facing Indonesia; And 
third, the counter-intelligence analysis looks 
at the development of national cyber 
threats. 
Trend of Increasing Cyber Threats in the 
Past One Decade 
According to Smith, the threat of cyber has 
been the source of various threats that not 
only attack the state / government, but also 
see organizations, companies, and   
individuals    being    the object. This is done 
in order to gain profit for their group, both 
financially, militarily, and his political 
interests.4 Can be likened to a double-edged 
sword, on the one hand cyberspace offers 
great benefits but security uncertainty is 
also a given, whether intentionally or not. 
According to Setyawan and Sumari, cyber 
threats are used because its scope is able to 
steal information, propagate destructive 
ideas, as well as attacks on information 
systems in various fields, such as banking 
4 Michael Smith, Research Handbook on 
International Law and Cyberspace, (Cheltenham 
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2015), p. 2. 
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data   and   military    networks   and    defense 
systems country. Even a survey conducted 
by the Ponemon Institute in 2015 of about 
1000 senior leaders of Information 
Technology (IT) and IT Security in various 
companies and   government   agencies   in   
America, Europe, Middle East and Africa 
said there was an ongoing increase in 
attacks on increasingly sophisticated 
countries followed by cyber threats and 
cyber terrorism and high data breakage.5  
The increasing rate of cyber-threats 
also occurred in the Asia Pacific region, 
including Indonesia, where in 2015 there 
was an increase of 61 malicious sites active 
hosts, which rose from 41 million in 20146. In 
recent years, the methods of cyber-attack 
actors have changed dramatically, where in 
the past attacks were still visible and 
opportunistic, targeting individual and non-
state objects. But now the coverage of 
cyber threats is wider with targets already 
                                                          
5  David Setyawan and Arwin Sumari, “Diplomasi 
Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Pencapaian 
Cybersecurity Melalui ASEAN Regional Forum on 
Cybersecurity Initiatives”, Jurnal Penelitian 
Politik,Vol. 13, No. 1, June 2016, Jakarta: Lembaga 
Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, p.3. 
6  “Catatan Trend Micro Tentang Ancaman Siber di 
Asia Pasifik”, Antara News, 17 June 2015, accessed 
on 7 June 2017. 
recorded from hidden actors7. This can be 
seen in Figure 1. 
Based on the picture, the 1980 - 1990 
cyberattacks are more inclined to the 
opportunist goal of benefiting the group. 
Call it like password guessing, self-replacing 
code, and bulgaries whose original purpose 
is to attack the company and get the funds. 
However, the trend of threats is increasingly 
changing from 2005 to 2015, where the 
characteristics of threats are already very 
stealthy and the use of the system is already 
more advanced in attacking the defense of 
a country. What is more dangerous is that 
cyberattacks do not require sophisticated 
equipment to attack, but enough with a 
reliable HR behind the screen of his laptop 
(tools). Cyber-threat terrorists are currently 
more diverse and numerous.8 
Types of Threat Currently Developing 
The Budapest Convention at the EU 
Convention on Cybercrime November 23th  
 
7 Eric Cole, “Detect, Contain, and Control 
Cyberthreats”, SANS Institute, June 2015, in 
https://www.sans.org/.../detect-
controlcyberthreats-36187, accessed on 7 June 
2017, p. 4. 
8  Ibid. 
















2001 in Hungary was established in order to 
recall the characteristic cybercrime threats 
that are borderless and use high technology 
as a medium. Therefore, this convention 
also sees criminalization policy in 
information technology that must pay 
attention to the development of cybercrime 
prevention both regionally and 
internationally in order to harmonize and  
 
                                                          
9  Amirulloh, Muhammad et al., “Laporan Kajian EU 
Conventional on Cybercrime Dikaitkan Dengan 
Upaya Regulasi Tindak Pidana Teknologi 
Informasi”,(Jakarta: Laporan Puslitbang Badan 
Pembinaan Hukum Nasional Departemen Hukum 
dan Hak Asasi Manusia Republik Indonesia, 
2009), p. 4. 















uniformity of cybercrime arrangement.9 
From this Budapest convention there are 
three types of cyber-threat categories that 
are described as follows:10 
1. First Category 
Cyber threats are a collection of types 
of attacks where information and 
communication technologies are the 
primary means or weapons to commit 
crimes. Examples are computers and 
Menjaga dan Melindungi Dunia Maya”, IDSIRTI 
(Internet and Infrastructure/Coordination 
Center) Indonesia, in http://www.idsirtii. 
or.id/doc/IDSIRTII-Artikel6_aspek_menjaga_dan_ 
melindungi_dunia_maya.pdf, pp.5, accessed on 
7 June 2017. 
 
Figure 1. Cyber Threat Evolution since 1980 – 2015 
Source: Eric Cole, “Detect, Contain, and Control Cyberthreats”, SANS Institute, June 2015, on 
https://www.sans.org/.../detect-control-cyberthreats-36187, accessed on 7 June 2017 
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the Internet are used as tools and 
mediums to spread heretical sect; A 
mobile phone used to send messages or 
text messages to deceive potential 
victims; And electronic mail is used as a 
means to transmit images or video 
nuances of pornography. 
2. Second Category 
Cyber threats are a collection of where 
computers or information technologies 
are subjected to a center of attack from 
criminals, such as, firstly, conducting 
fictitious financial transactions in an 
internet-based banking system (e-
banking); Second, shut down or 
dismantle the work of a remote internet 
network; And third, spreading viruses 
to interfere with the performance of 
certain computers. 
3. Third Category 
This cyber threat is aimed at events 
intended to destroying (including 
modifying and fabricating) data or 
information stored in the media of 
information technology devices. 
Attacks in this category include: first, 
changing the content of a site without 
the owner's knowledge; second, take a 
collection of passwords or complete 
credit card information of a group of 
individuals for misuse or sale; and third, 
damage the main database system so 
that the information in it becomes 
unreadable or accessed normally and so 
forth.  
The three types of threats above show 
that the subject of cyber threats is not only 
directed to the government, but including 
individuals, community groups, and 
companies. The impact is obviously great 
although there is no dose calculating the 
loss conversion caused by cyberspace, but 
certainly this type of threat and threat trend 
will certainly increase steadily along with 
the development of technology. According 
to Brenner & Clarke, there are three reasons 
why this type of cyber threat is currently 
preferred over conventional attacks, like 
the military in general.  
Firstly, developing a cyber-siege 
capacity costs less than developing the 
capacity of military wars in the 21st century. 
The cost of cyberwarfare includes training 
and financing of hardware and software 
cost less than conventional warfare. 
Second, the use of actors is much less than 
the military war, and the implementation 
can be done from a distance. That is, cyber 
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war no longer sees distance, time, and 
number of personnel, but as long as the 
system can be attacked then a country can 
easily perform cyberattacks. The actor is not 
limited whether state or non-state, as long 
as they are able to attack the intended 
system, whether it is state property or 
company or group. Thirdly, cyberattacks are 
very easy to sponsor without knowing who 
the real actors are, whether it's A country, 
country B, organization A, organization B, or 
even just a handful of groups / individuals.11 
Cyber Threats Challenges in Indonesia and 
Its Current Policy  
It cannot be denied that the urgent 
condition of cyber threat in Indonesia can be 
said in critical condition. With a population 
of 132 million internet users in 2016 it is not 
impossible that Indonesia becomes an easy 
target for cyberattacks from state and non-
state actors. The description of internet 
users in Indonesia can be seen as follows:12 
(1) 67.2 million people or 50.7 percent access 
through handheld devices and computers; 
                                                          
11  Susan Brenner dan Leo Clarke, “Civilians in 
Cyberwarfare: Conscripts, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol.  43, pp. 1011, 2011, 
University of Dayton School of Law, 2011, pp. 3-4. 
12  “2016, Internet Users in Indonesia Reach 132 
Million”, in 
http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2016/10/24/15064
(2) 63.1 million people or 47.6 percent 
access from smartphones; and (3) 2.2 million 
people or 1.7 percent access only from 
computers. In addition, from a survey 
presented by APJII (Association of 
Indonesian Internet Network Providers), it 
was noted that approximately 86.3 million 
people or 65 percent of the total number of 
internet users this year are in Java. While the 
rest are as follows; (1) 20.7 million or 15.7 
percent in Sumatra; (2) 8.4 million or 6.3 
percent in Sulawesi; (3) 7.6 million or 5.8 
percent in Kalimantan; (4) 6.1 million or 4.7 
percent in Bali and NTB; And (5) 3.3 million 
or 2.5 percent in Maluku and Papua.  
Looking at the data above and 
compared with the government's readiness 
in regulating national cyber security, it is not 
surprising if there is still a lot of criticism 
from most community groups. According to 
Adriyanti (2016) there are five cyber-security 
policies in Indonesia at this time that get full 
attention, namely:13 
a. Legal Certainty 
727/2016.pengguna.internet.di.indonesia.capai.13
2.juta, accessed at kompas.com, in July 18th 2017, 
issue 24 October 2016. 
13 Handrini Andriyanti. “Cyber Security dan 
Tantangan Pengembangannya di Indonesia”, 
Jurnal Politica Vol. 5 No.1 June 2014, pp. 99 - 101 
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The legality of criminal handling in the 
cyber world is still weak because despite 
the existing laws and regulations that 
prohibit the form of attack or destruction 
of electronic systems in the Act of 
Information and Electronic Transactions 
No.11 of 2008, there is no legislation 
regulating specifically cybercrime and 
cybercrime handling while on the other 
hand the form of crime of cyber world is 
increasing and the pattern of occurrence 
so fast that it is difficult to be handled by 
law enforcement officers. 
b. Technical and Procedural Measures  
Cybercrime handling is still partial and 
scattered and there is no standard 
coordination in handling cybersecurity 
issues. The low awareness of the cyber 
threat attacks that impactfully cripple 
vital infrastructure. An example is the 
flight radar system at Soekarno-Hatta 
international airport which has been 
interrupted several times.  
c. Organizational Structure 
Cyber-security handling in the state 
defense framework is still sectoral and 
uncoiled and unified. Although in the 
end, the government succeeded in 
                                                          
14  Ibid. 
forming the State Cyber and Code 
Agency through Presidential Regulation 
Number: 53 of 2017 on Cyber and State 
Codes.  
d. Capacity Building 
Human resource development is needed 
on the importance of cyber-security in 
order to increase understanding of 
preventive measures in preventing all 
cybercrime. 
e. International Collaboration 
Strengthening international cooperation 
with regional and international 
organizations in the context of 
cybercrime prevention. Cooperation in 
order to overcome cybercrime that 
Indonesia has done on a regional scale 
and global.  
Based on the description above , it can 
be seen how the current conditions and 
approaches that have been done by the 
Government. Based on a journal written by 
Handrini14, the existing approach is still not 
maximum when compared to the threat 
intensity level and its variation. Moreover, 
internet users in Indonesia are numerous. 
Therefore, the strengthening of counter-
intelligence approach becomes one of the 
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scopes of discussion that should be done by 
intelligence agencies together with other 
relevant stakeholders. 
Approach to Counter Cyber Intelligence in 
Facing Threats 
Previously it should be understood in 
advance the function of intelligence based 
on applicable law in Indonesia. Referring to 
Law no. 17 of 2011 About State Intelligence, 
then the interpretation of the intelligence 
function is the function of investigation, 
security, and promoting. Where the 
counter-intelligence activities themselves 
fall into the category of promoting 
functions within the written Intelligence Act 
"a series of activities conducted in a planned 
and directed manner to prevent and/or 
combat attempts, work, activities of 
Intelligence, and or Opponents that harms 
national interests and security."15 There are 
four main aspects of intelligence activities, 
namely counter intelligence, espionage, 
propaganda, and sabotage. According 
Soeripto in Praditya, counter-intelligence 
itself is a preemptive activity that is 
confidential. The goal is to narrow the 
space, ward off, thwart, and destroy 
                                                          
15  See Law No. 17 of 2011 about State Intelligence 
Chapter 6 Article 3. 
opponent's intelligence operations. The 
operation of counter-intelligence is divided 
into two, namely passive and active, as 
described below:16 
1. Passive Counter Intelligence  
Includes four things. First, secret 
restriction by limiting the number of 
people who know the secret, where the 
fewer people who know the secret then 
the chances of success will be greater. 
Second, information security by all means 
to prevent the opponent from knowing 
the information. Third, it filters out all 
sorts of activities and relationships in 
enemy movements. Fourth, do 
camouflage by changing the shape of 
something or give wrong info to the 
enemy. Fifth, concealment of the 
intelligence movement to be unknown to 
the enemy. 
2. Active Counter Intelligence 
Active counter-intelligence leads to 
empowerment of intelligence activities 
to gain information from opponents by 
eliminating threats, challenges, 
obstacles, and distractions. Active 
counter-intelligence acts as a counter 
16  Yosua Praditya, Keamanan di Indonesia, (Jakarta: 
Nadi Pustaka, 2016), pp. 246–247. 
The Use of Counter–Intelligence Operation Strategy in Coping with … | Yosua Praditya Suratman | 9 
 
penetration, counter infiltration, counter 
espionage, counter sabotage maker, and 
the use of special camouflage in 
opponent, enemy, or enemy territory. 
For example, counter-espionage 
counters must be actively observing 
constantly any symptoms that arise, until 
the case is revealed. Meanwhile, counter-
surveillance is an attempt to conduct 
surveillance against the opposing party. 
Reconnaissance in this case focuses on 
securing, defending, and protecting any 
intelligence activities of the enemy. The 
main differentiator in active counter-
intelligence is its more attacking activity, 
rather than persisting. Furthermore, 
according to Rahardjo, the above 
counter-intelligence division can be 
subdivided into vertical and horizontal 
sections as shown in the Chart 117. 
 
Chart 1. Counter Intelligence Matix 
Defensive Mode 
Blocks opposing access and gather information about opponents 
Passive Defense  
Block Opposing Access to Information 
Active Defense 
Investigate opponent’s action using 
surveillance, feed, double agent, spy, or 
electronic tapping 
Offensive Mode 
Aim to manipulate, control, and thwart opponent’s action 
Passive Offence 
Allowing the opponent see false 
information (seeing something that is not 
there, or something false, camouflage) 
Active Offence 
Directly sends false information through 
secretive actions  
 
Source: Beer and Basie on Elsa Vinietta, http://budi.rahardjo.id/files/courses/2016/EL6115-2016-
23215130-Report.pdf, accessed on 7 June 2017, p. 5. 
 
 
                                                          
17  Budi Rahardjo, “Strategi Operasi Kontra Inteijen 
Cyber Sebagai Upaya Peningkatan Ketahanan 
Negara Indonesia”, on http://budi.rahardjo.id, 
accessed on 7 June 2017, p. 5. 











Figure 2. Integrated Counter Cyber Intelligence 
Source: Beer and Basie in Elsa Vinietta, 
http://budi.rahardjo.id/files/courses/2016/EL6115-2016-23215130-
Report.pdf, accessed on 7 June 2017. 
Based on the Chart 1, both passive and 
active intelligence counter, ideally 
inseparable because the implementation 
should be done synergistically. What makes 
the difference is each mission, both 
offensive and defensive, which shows each 
action to ward off the enemy. Meanwhile, 
the vertical division distinguishes counter-
intelligence operations from being active or 
passive based on the intensity of the given 
response. Passive action is done by 
protecting     while    waiting     or     allowing  
opponent operations but with minimal 
response, while active action is made by 
performing certain responses according to 
                                                          
18  Elsa Vinietta, “Strategi Operasi Kontra Intelijen 
Cyber Sebagai Upaya Peningkatan Ketahanan 
Negara Indonesia”, on 
the circumstances.18 Furthermore, if in 
seeing the linkage of cyber threat with 
counter cyber intelligence then can be seen 
in the Figure 2. 
In the Figure 2, the intensity of 
cyberattacks is categorized as low and high 
intensity.  With reference to the method of 
integrated counter-intelligence then the 
interpretation can be seen in the Table 119. 
Based on the Table 1, it can be seen 
how each counter cyber intelligence 
approach are integrated against cyber 
threat. By using Table 1 we can analyze 
resources, including human, financial, and 
tools can be used effectively and efficiently. 
 http://budi.rahardjo.id/files/courses/2016/EL6115-
2016-23215130-Report.pdf, accessed on 7 June 
2017, p. 6. 
19  Ibid, p.10. 
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Keep in mind in dealing with cyber threats, 
resources have to be tailored to the shape 
and extent of the threat intensity, so the 
government does not incur excessive costs 
compared to reality. Cost to handle cyber 
threats does not need to be abundant 
provided that the human resources used 
given the right tools. 
Table 1. Integrated Counter Cyber Intelligence Explanation 
No Method Flow of Operation Mechanism   
1 First Strategy- Active Counter Intelligence 
Offensive High Intensity 
Objective-> Attacking;  
Opponent-> Identified;  
Priority -> High; 
2 Second Strategy- Passive Counter Intelligence 
Offensive High Intensity 
 
Objective -> Attacking;  
Opponent-> Identified;  
Priority -> Low;  
3 Third Strategy -  Active Offensive Counter 
Intelligence 
 Low Intensity 
Objective-> Attacking;  
Opponent -> Unknown;  
Strategy -> Offensive 
4 Fourth Strategy -  Passive Counter Intelligence 
Offensive Low Intensity 
Objective -> Attacking; 
Opponent -> Identified;  
Strategy -> Passive 
5 Fifth Strategy – Active Defense Counter 
Intelligence  
High Intensity  
Objective -> Defense;  
Information -> Crucial;  
Security Threat -> Exist (High). 
6 Sixth Strategy – Active Defense Counter 
Intelligence 
 Low Intensity 
Objective-> defense;  
Information -> Crucial; 
Security Threat -> Low 
 
7 Seventh Strategy – Passive Defense Counter 
Intelligence  
High Intensity  
Objective-> Defense;  
Information -> Crucial;  
Security Threat -> exist (high) 
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8 Eighth Strategy – Passive Defense Counter 
Intelligence 
 Low Intensity 
Objective-> Defense;  
Information -> Not Crucial;  
Threat Risk -> Low 
 
Source: Substracted by Author from Elsa Vinietta, “Strategi Operasi Kontra Inteijen Cyber sebagai 
Upaya Peningkatan Ketahanan Negara Indonesia”, on 
http://budi.rahardjo.id/files/courses/2016/EL6115-2016-23215130-Report.pdf, accessed on 7 June 2017. 
 
Analysis of Cyber Counter Intelligence in 
Engaging National Cyber Threat 
From the description of the table above, 
then the author has an analysis to see how 
the cyber threat are handled accordingly 
with the method. Here is the explanation: 
1. Active Offense Counter Intelligence High 
Intensity 
The approach can be done with two 
things, namely cyber war and the use of 
virtual agents. Indonesia itself is 
considered still lagging behind the cyber 
war between countries, because 
Indonesia is actually a market or "easy 
target" of other countries. Usually other 
countries do so by offering free services 
to the people of Indonesia in order to 
volunteer and be happy to provide 
personal information through the medial 
social. Yet these ways are categorized as 
                                                          
20  The statement of Chief of Communication and 
Information System Security Research 
Centre/CISSReC (Lembaga Riset Cyber dan 
Komunikasi) Pratama D Persada, “Perang Siber 
cyber war (active offense) by a country to 
Indonesia. Both civil servants (PNS), 
military-security apparatuses, including 
civilians must provide detailed 
information to email and social media.20 
As for the availability of virtual agents in 
Indonesia, the spread is still scattered 
and actually sometimes even attack 
government agencies, Police, and state-
owned companies. Though such hackers 
can be used by officials to be empowered 
to help national cyber resistance from 
the threat of the hackers. While in big 
countries, like the US and Russia, it is 
commonplace that hackers are 
empowered to attack other countries' 
security-defense systems. In essence this 
counter-intelligence strategy is 
attacking, the object is known (usually 
Sudah Menjadi Ancaman Serius”, on 
http://www.republika.co.id, 17 September 2016, 
accessed on 8 June 2017. 
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the IT system of other countries), and it is 
something that is prioritized.  
2. Passive Offense Counter Intelligence High 
Intensity 
This strategy is Passive (not attack) 
because the main purpose is to collect 
information in detecting cyber threats / 
enemies. In Indonesia it finally endorsed 
the State Cyber and Codes (BSSN) based 
on Presidential Regulation no. 53 of 2017 
by President Joko Widodo. The task of 
BSSN is to implement cyber security 
effectively and efficiently by utilizing, 
developing, and consolidating all 
elements related to cybersecurity. In 
performing these tasks, BSSN performs 
the functions of: preparation, 
implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of technical policies in the 
areas of identification, detection, 
protection, control, recovery, 
monitoring, evaluation, control of 
ecommerce protection, coding, 
screening, cyber diplomacy, Mitigation 
support, recovery of countermeasures, 
vulnerabilities, incidents and / or 
cyberattacks21. The presence of BSSN will 
                                                          
21  See Presidential Decree Number 53 of 2017 about 
BSSN on Chapter 1 Article 3. 
greatly assist the government to collect 
all forms of important and confidential 
information, and is expected to assist the 
defense and intelligence apparatus in 
counter-espionage in cyber world.   
3. Active Offense Counter Intelligence High 
Intensity 
This strategy is done with the attacking 
system even though the enemy (object) 
is not yet known because of the very high 
threat intensity. For example, the threats 
of ransomware that attack public 
facilities are generally unknown to who 
the actors are, but this does not make the 
government behave Passive. Recently 
Indonesia was shocked by the wannacry 
ransomware attack, which according to 
M. Salahuddin, Chairman of the 
Indonesia Security Incident Response 
Team on Internet Infrastructure (Id-
SIRTII) revealed the potential for 
wannacry's ransomware distribution will 
still be open in Indonesia as Indonesia is a 
very vulnerable market. Ransomeware of 
this type will later ask for ransom of Rp 4 
million in the form of virtual currency 
(cryptocurrency) Bitcoin sent to the 
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address of the digital wallet of cyber 
criminals22. This ransomeware virus is 
suspected to use cyber weapons owned 
by the US intelligence service, the NSA, 
which in April was stolen and leaked by a 
group of hackers named Shadow Broker. 
The tool named "EnternalBlue" takes 
advantage of security holes in the 
Windows operating system via remote 
code execution SMBv123. Although the 
government has difficulty knowing the 
details of Broken Shadow in spreading 
the virus, the government has learned 
that the virus is leaking from the NSA. 
Therefore, the government's strategy is 
how to deal with a virus or weapon 
potentially leaking from the NSA and 
misused by hacker groups. 
4. Passive Offense Counter Intelligence Low 
Intensity 
The attack strategy is done passively 
considering the target / object is known 
and the goal is still focused to gather 
information. What makes the difference 
is its low intensity. Government, in this 
case coordination between the Ministry 
                                                          
22  “Intel AS di Balik ‘Ransomware’ yang menyerang 
rumah sakit Indonesia,” 13 May 2015, 
http://www.kompas.com, accessed on 8 June 
2017. 
of Information with BSSN and security-
intelligence apparatus need to map the 
potential of the threat that is not too 
high. The goal is that in the future the 
government will not be bothered by the 
threat that has been transformed into a 
threat that has a big impact. For example, 
10 years ago, the government was not yet 
aware of the immense social impacts of 
the use of social media and the internet 
by the public, whereby anyone can now 
voice his political opinions as long as they 
do not violate the rules. But the fact is, 
the spread of hate speech, provocative 
messages, and hoax news are hard to 
stem, and the fact that this tendency 
becomes a proxy war of other countries 
to bring Indonesia down. Taxonomic 
conflicts that occur are closely related to 
the proxy war and its spread is greatly 
helped by the internet / social world. That 
is, the government 10 years ago failed to 
counter passive offensive intelligence to 
the threat of low intensity (social media / 
internet), but in fact, now the threat is 
already transformed and has a very 
23  “Begini Cara Menangkal ‘ransomware’ 
wannacray”, http//www.kompas.com, 13 May 
2017, accessed on 8 June 2017. 
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destructive power for the Indonesian 
social environment.  
5. Active Defense Counter Intelligence High 
Intensity 
This strategy combines two things, 
namely hardware and software. On the 
hardware side, clearly Indonesia needs to 
be supported by the presence of 
adequate caliber infrastructure. 
Currently, Indonesia is estimated to lose 
trillions of rupiah each year, one of them 
because it does not pay attention to the 
security of communication systems, 
including the infrastructure. For 
example, in the case of illegal logging and 
illegal fishing that always happens 
because of a well-coordinated 
communication system and low 
technology infrastructure. In addition, 
the lack of infrastructure can affect the 
vulnerability of data breaches of 
Indonesian people using e-ID card 
(estimated as many as 180 million 
inhabitants).24 While on the software, the 
government through the presence of 
BSSN able to upgrade the IT security 
system in each institution / agency that 
                                                          
24  Republika Newspaper’s interview with the Chief 
of CISSReC, on the subject of “Indonesia Butuh 
Lembaga Pertahanan Siber”, on 
exists. The implementation of electronic-
based government system (E-
Government) is an object that needs to 
be improved, because Indonesia is still 
feared to be an easy target for cyber 
criminals.  
6. Active Defense Counter Intelligence Low 
Intensity 
This strategy is actually the same as the 
previous strategy, which combines two 
things, namely hardware and software. 
But its implementation is directed to 
threats of low intensity. In this case the 
government should no longer 
underestimate the small impact of cyber 
threats, because this type of threat will 
certainly transform in a relatively short 
time. Low risk level threats do not make 
the Government stop thinking about the 
hardware and software installation 
strategy needed as a preventive step in 
the future. An example can be taken, 
when the CISSReC (Communication and 
Information System Security Research) 
agency advises the government to build 
an integrated passport database system, 
so that it can check online passport 
http://www.republika.co.id, accessed on 8 June 
2017. 
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exclusively against multiple passports in 
Indonesia or elsewhere.25 While this type 
of threat to dual passport ownership has 
not been so much intensified over double 
IDs, it does not mean the government is 
doing nothing.  
7. Passive Defense Counter Intelligence High 
Intensity  
This strategy which puts forward its 
physical defense, be it for security system 
of IT security and intelligence apparatus, 
and other Ministry facilities. The goal is to 
maintain the system facilities from the 
threat of data theft, both hardware and 
software, or any malware attacks that 
can shut down government-owned IT 
hardware. In addition, this strategy 
focuses on routine IT personnel checks, 
in terms of personnel usage and 
measurement, and leaves no vital chain 
of management within the IT sector 
itself. The ultimate goal is to get the 
security expected. An example can be 
taken from the air force defense, for 
example, to strengthen the ADIZ (Air 
Defense Identification Zone) Air Force 
                                                          
25 “Indonesia diusulkan Segera Bangun Sistem 
Paspor Terintegrasi,” on 
https://www.cissrec.org/, 14 September 2016, 
accessed on 9 June 2017. 
requires the addition of 12 air radar.26 
Where the addition of radar is certainly 
followed by the addition of the number 
of personnel and training. Radar is the 
equipment that is the physical 
infrastructure required by ADIZ which is 
no longer only partial in the form of small 
circle of archipelago (Java, Sumatera, 
Kalimantan, etc.) but has a large circle 
including air space from Sabang to 
Merauke. 
8. Passive Defense Counter Intelligence High 
Intensity 
This strategy is the same as the previous 
one (No. 7), namely emphasis on the 
construction of physical facilities and 
human resources and maintenance. But 
what distinguishes it is this strategy is 
addressed to the types of threats with 
low intensity. In the past decade, there 
are still many countries that have not yet 
thought about building an information 
storage database in the cloud, where the 
US is the only country that has thought 
about it. They think the data is safer 
stored in the cloud with the help of 
26 “TNI AU Perkuat Zona Identifikasi Pertahanan 
Udara,” on http://nasional.kompas.com/, 7 April 
2017, accessed on 9 June 2017. 
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satellite technology than it is stored on 
hardware which is prone to be stolen, 
especially for their military and 
intelligence purposes.  
Conclusion 
The increasing trend of cyber threat has 
increased very rapidly, where the criminals 
can be done by anyone. Meanwhile, 
Indonesia is categorized as the most 
vulnerable country and the tenderest target 
in the Asian environment. Penetration of 
cyber threats so powerful has occurred, 
whether it is data theft or the destruction of 
government and private information 
systems. The cyber threat becomes an 
option for the criminals because it is not 
costly, does not require a lot of personnel, is 
not visible, and they are able to control it 
from a great distance, even across countries 
and continents. Therefore, the government, 
in this case the security-intelligence 
apparatus needs to carry out the 
appropriate counter-intelligence operations 
strategy in dealing with the growing cyber 
threat. Counter-intelligence strategy 
becomes one of the main options because it 
is confidential and able to narrow the space 
of cyber threat from various lines. 
Intelligence measures and strategies are at 
the forefront of cyberattacks that are 
predicted to increase in the future. 
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